

The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC No. 6587-83  
13 September 1983

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM : Milton Kovner  
National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe

SUBJECT : INF Deployments and Prospects for a "Hot Autumn"

1. The NIC Analytic Group, working with a text contributed by DDI/EURA, is preparing an Intelligence Memorandum on INF and the prospects for a "hot autumn." You might be interested in some of its preliminary conclusions.

2. The December 1983 deployment date has provided the peace movement with a target on which to focus, and we anticipate a major, last-ditch effort to deter acceptance of the US missiles. Contacts among peace groups in most of the INF basing countries have become more frequent and more systemized, and adequate financing for the fall campaign, funneled through the churches and from those communist parties and fronts that are subsidized from the East, seems assured. The largest demonstrations have been planned for Bonn, Hamburg, Stuttgart, London, Rome, Brussels, and the Hague during the week of 22-29 October. West German officials estimate that between 1.5 and 3.0 million demonstrators will take to the streets during the pre-deployment period.

3. The ability of the peace protestors to mass large scale demonstrations will, however, mask the movement's internecine quarrels over strategy and tactics and the increasingly somber mood of its leadership. Divisions between communist and non-communist groups and between those factions supporting and opposing violent action will probably grow wider as the deployment date nears, making it unlikely that protestors will be able to present a united front this fall. The movement's leaders, moreover, have become frustrated over their inability to affect government policy and substantially to increase the movement's strength as a pressure group over the past year. Some appear all but resigned to the fact that deployment is unavoidable and that the momentum of the movement will slow even further after initial deployments occur.

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4. The stage is also set for a shift in tactics and targets. While the mainstream peace organizations -- church groups, environmentalists, leftists and trade unions -- will concentrate on essentially non-violent mass demonstrations, should these prove ineffective in altering government policies on INF, other groups could shift the focus to attempted disruptions of US military operations, a wide variety of headline grabbing "symbolic" actions, and more violent acts. Small but militant autonomous groups are almost certain to take more aggressive actions in West Germany, and to a lesser extent in Italy and the Netherlands. Such groups are planning to incite riots, penetrate military installations, and engage in sabotage tactics to disrupt military maneuvers, munitions trains, truck and barge movements.

[redacted] indicates that terrorist support groups -- especially Red Army Faction (RAF) sympathizers in West Germany -- have taken an active part in the meetings and activities of militant autonomous groups.

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5. The diversity of views and tactics among these groups will confront governments with the difficult task of anticipating anti-nuclear events in many different localities and responding in ways that will maintain law and order while avoiding public charges of brutality. Should local authorities overreact to demonstrations against INF, charges of "official oppression" might well engage those not currently within the anti-INF forces by focusing attention on the wider issue of civil liberties. In West Germany, where the public is especially sensitive to the historical record of political oppression, a civil rights controversy could substantially reinforce domestic pressures for a change in official INF policies.

6. The Soviets also appear to be aware that the peace movement is unlikely to coerce NATO governments into rejecting INF deployment. Nonetheless, they continue to court non-communist groups on INF, especially the West German Social Democrats and the Greens, and to subsidize local communist parties and front groups in order to push their own peace campaign. They are likely to keep a low profile toward the movement itself in order to deflect publicized accusations that Moscow is manipulating protest activities.

[redacted] forming common fronts with other groups was more important than ensuring absolute adherence to the communist line in protest activity. It cannot be entirely ruled out, however, that Moscow might come to view violent protest -- in the face of almost certain deployment -- as a way to unsettle publics and further polarize West European societies.

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Milton Kovner

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI  
DDCI

THROUGH : VC/NIC

FROM : NIO/WE

SUBJECT : INF Deployments and Prospects for a "Hot Autumn"

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